



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Problem of Luxemburg.



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The Problem of Luxemburg

By

Xavier Prum, A.M.


Professor of Mathematics in Dubuque College



The Knickerbocker Press

New York

1919



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XAVIER PRUM

FOREWORD

XAVIER PRUM, the author of this plea for a change in the status of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, knows from bitter experience what it means to belong to a small defenseless nation, whose sole hedge of protection was woven of promises to respect its neutrality. All proved worthless when it suited Germany to cross these neutral frontiers, in her mad desire to gain Paris before the less prepared nations should have time to gird themselves for resistance. Xavier Prum, a recent graduate of Louvain, was caught in Canada, when the storm of 1914 burst and found no consul or minister to help him regain his non-belligerent native land. No post office or tele-

graph official would receive a communication for Luxemburg. It was in the grasp of the Germans and the native protests against their hold made no difference. The traveler, here for a trip only, was unable to go home. Fortunately he succeeded in obtaining a position to teach mathematics in Dubuque College, Iowa—a lucky chance it was, as differential calculus is not an invariably marketable commodity! And here he has remained during the years of the war, receiving only scant information about his homeland in roundabout ways. His anxiety was the greater because he did learn, indirectly, that his father had been taken to a German prison. Here was another reason and a graver one for conviction that the rights of Luxemburg people were ill-defended. The treatment accorded to a worthy magistrate is a striking instance of Teutonic methods in a region which

officials had declared that they just wanted to cross.

Emile Prum was a manufacturer in Clerf or Clervaux. In 1914-15 he was burgomaster, having earlier served as deputy to the parliament in Luxemburg. He was known as a leader of the Catholics, often in opposition to M. Eyschen, then President of the Government. He was far less in sympathy with France than with Germany, where he was in the habit of taking part in congresses of Catholics, and where he was in close touch with the Centrist party of the Reichstag. The events of the early months of the war roused his intense indignation. He felt that his friends, the German Catholics, must also be roused to action. He could not understand their apathy when their Belgian brothers were suffering as they were. His *Open Letter* to Erzberger, leader of the German

Catholic party, was printed in the *Clerfer Echo* (March, 1915), and in the *Fortschritt* of Diekirch. Then it was put into a pamphlet of forty-two pages, which was, however, immediately seized by the Luxemburg police at the request of the German authorities, who had *not* simply crossed the Grand Duchy to leave it on the other side. Prussian control was making itself felt in every walk of life among those non-belligerents. Just a few brochures escaped destruction and *Le Correspondant* informed its readers of the incident (April, 1915). The contents of the suppressed pamphlet were highly displeasing to the recipient as they were a passionate arraignment of the actions of the Germans in Belgium. Some of the phrases of the closing paragraphs were: "Do not, I beg you, Sir, attribute the freedom of language here to Germanophobe intentions. On the very eve

of hostilities, I was writing, on this western frontier of the Germanic linguistic area, in favour of true Germanism as against an exaggerated *franscaillerie*. I address myself, not to the Germanophobe Press abroad, but to Germany, to you, the member of the Reichstag, as the qualified representative of the German Catholics. The German people, poisoned by the information given by a Press devoid of a conscience, is the prey of a sort of Nationalist delirium." From the "vertigo of a national hatred," this "Commander of the Order of St. Sylvester," and "Member of the Permanent Committee of the International Eucharistic Congress" hoped to lead the faithful of his communion to an understanding of German crimes.

But he simply excited violent opposition. Proceedings were begun against him on the score that he had used unsub-

stantiated foreign statements to malign Germany. Art. 129 of the Luxemburg constitution provided for the punishment of any one who should expose the State to foreign hostilities by "hostile action." And Prum's pamphlet was construed as being such "hostile action." There was a paper controversy through the summer of 1915. In October, Prum wrote a second pamphlet entitled *The Widowhood of Truth*. The chance of a three-day suspension of the censorship covering All Saints' and All Souls' Days, with a Sunday, enabled Prum to send some of these across the frontier. That gave an opening, and on November 3d he was arrested summarily at 6 A.M. and taken to Treves, thus out of Luxemburg into Germany. No opportunity was given him of showing proofs for his statements. On the charge of insulting the German Army, a military tribunal con-

demned this neutral Luxemburg civilian burgomaster to a three-year imprisonment in solitary confinement. At the end of half this term, owing to the efforts of the Grand Duchess and the Pope, the sentence was commuted to internment in Breslau. The next event is still unexplained. In October, 1918, a fresh sentence condemned him to three months' solitary confinement. But here, the Armistice of November 11th was the agent of intervention and release followed. Meantime his older son has been sitting in the Luxemburg parliament and was among the deputies calling for a referendum as to a change in the status of the Grand Duchy. Xavier Prum, thus, gives his opinion as a Luxemburger and as a member of a family which has been closely identified with life and events in his native state. That, for the moment, he is expatriated, is a

chance of war, but he knows whereof he speaks and his opinion is entitled to a hearing.

RUTH PUTNAM.

WASHINGTON, D. C., Feb 4.

PRELIMINARY REMARKS

THE victorious powers in the war just concluded asserted their cause to be the cause of freedom and justice and the right of nations to self-determination. Again and again the statesmen of the Entente declared themselves the champions of small nations and oppressed races. Now one such small nation and precisely such a victim of oppression is the subject of our sketch.

Luxemburg, although small, is certainly the home of a distinct race and has for centuries manifested in her national life the essential characteristics of a well-defined nationality. She has a history, national traditions, a lan-

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guage, and customs all her own. In a word, Luxemburg is a distinct race and as such, according to the principles avowed by the victors in the late war, has an unquestionable right to a separate existence.

However, Luxemburg is too small and too weak to exist in complete isolation. As we shall see in Chapter II of this sketch, complete isolation would prove fatal to the economic existence and even to the national well-being generally. Luxemburg therefore must seek among the larger powers a friendly affinity and an agreeable complement to the interests, social, cultural, political, and economic of her national life.

Various solutions have been proposed to the problem facing Luxemburg. They may be grouped under three heads: First, we have the partisans of complete autonomy; secondly, of annexation to

France; and, lastly, of association under some form or other with Belgium.

After careful and conscientious consideration we deem as most reasonable and most satisfying for all parties concerned the last solution, which would preserve separate national existence to Luxemburg and at the same time obtain for her the innumerable benefits accruing from association with a large, friendly, and kindred nation, whose historic past and national life Luxemburg has shared for centuries.

To those who object to this solution as not ideal and foreign to their romantic, poetic, and quixotic notions, we would suggest that we do not live in an ideal world, but, alas! in a very real one. Therefore we must accept conditions as we find them. Lydia Bennet, in Jane Austen's *Pride and Prejudice*, did not think her new bonnet very pretty, but

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thought she might as well buy it as not,
and vowed there were two or three much
uglier in the shop.

X. P.

DUBUQUE, IOWA, Jan. 27, 1919.

The Problem of Luxemburg

The Problem of Luxemburg

I

LUXEMBURG TRIBUTARY TO GERMANY

THE GENESIS OF THE GRAND DUCHY

JUNE 9, 1815, marks the birth of Luxemburg as a Grand Duchy. It was created by the Congress of Vienna and placed under the sovereignty of the King of the Netherlands to indemnify him for the loss of several provinces that he was forced to cede to the King of Prussia. That celebrated Congress, as is well known, sought to solve the problems that it faced rather from the point of view of

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the interests of dynasties than of nations. Its solutions, therefore, based as they were on a basis more artificial than natural, were very unsatisfactory; and to make matters worse, they were formulated in so vague and indeterminate a manner as to admit of the most conflicting interpretations. Thus was the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg incorporated into the German Confederation, a fact, however, which did not interfere with King William of the Netherlands calling it in a Royal Proclamation an "integral part of the Netherlands." It was, no doubt, partially due to this state of confusion that Luxemburg did not participate more completely in the Belgian Revolution in 1830. After this revolution, Luxemburg was separated from the newly erected Belgian Kingdom and constituted into a separate state.

In 1866 the German Confederation,

of which Luxemburg still formed part, was dissolved and France through Napoleon III made a vain effort to absorb Luxemburg by purchasing her from the King of the Netherlands. At that time, although Luxemburg had ostensibly acquired her full autonomy through the dissolution of the German Confederation, the King of Prussia notwithstanding arrogated to himself the right of keeping a garrison in the city of Luxemburg.

The situation grew very acute and a war between France and Prussia seemed inevitable. At this critical moment, England's offer to mediate was accepted and the contending parties arrived at a compromise, embodied in the Treaty of London, 1867, whereby France abandoned her plans of purchasing the Grand Duchy and the King of Prussia pledged himself to withdraw his garrison from

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Luxemburg. The Grand Duchy, according to one of the articles of that treaty, was declared a "perpetually neutral state" and placed under the collective guarantee of Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia.

PERPETUAL NEUTRALITY

The perpetual neutrality then guaranteed to Luxemburg is a curious piece of diplomatic shuffling. The great powers in the treaties guaranteeing the neutralities of Belgium and Switzerland obliged these countries to the defense of their neutrality; whereas the Treaty of London permitted Luxemburg a mere passive resistance in the event of an invasion of her rights. The neutrality of Belgium is, according to the words of Leopold I, "*sincère, loyale et forte*," the truth of which the calamitous days of

August, 1914, have given us such glorious proof.

Even before the ratification of the twenty-four articles granting Belgium independence, she had to promise "always to keep in good condition" certain fortresses, and Switzerland, through her treaties of independence acquired the right to occupy for her defense, certain fortresses belonging to France. Luxemburg, on the other hand, was forced, by Articles 2, 3, and 5 of the Treaty of London, to dismantle the fortress of Luxemburg, to promise that it should never be rebuilt, and to promise further not to maintain any military establishment except such as might be necessary to preserve order.

Thus the Grand Duchy was forced to renounce forever the right of waging war and even the right of defending the integrity of its territory other than by passive resistance (P. Eyschen, *Staats-*

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recht, p. 42), a right which, as Bluntschli acutely remarks, is an essential prerogative of a sovereign independent state. For that matter it is quite clear that in reality Luxemburg has never been independent. According to Klueber "every state as a free moral personality is its own end and should not serve as a means for the ends of other states." Far from realizing this essential attribute of a free state, Luxemburg had to submit to political and military subserviency to Germany. Thus, although theoretically independent Luxemburg, to all intents and purposes except liability to military service, formed an integral part of the late German Empire. Indeed, whatever shadow of political independence Luxemburg retained was due to the jealousy of the Great Powers. German domination of Luxemburg shows up clearly in connection with the railways and the Zollverein.

THE ZOLLVEREIN

Luxemburg has belonged to the German Zollverein (German Customs Union) since 1842. The fact that a country enters with another country into an economic alliance of the nature of the Zollverein, does not, theoretically speaking, interfere with its independent existence. In practice, however, such an alliance profoundly affects the national character through the economic life of a country. The inhabitants of the two countries meet frequently and not as foreigners, because they have common interests and with the products of their industries they exchange their ideas and culture and thus tend to amalgamate into a homogeneous whole.

The influence of the Zollverein affected strongly the legislation of Luxemburg, which had to conform to that of the other states included in the Zollverein. And

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if the cost of living a few years prior to the war was so much higher in Luxemburg than in Belgium, for instance, this was due to the influence of the Zollverein. Germany was making incredible efforts to create a navy equal to her army, and the indirect taxes, imposed in consequence—the direct taxes did, of course, not concern Luxemburg—on necessities as well as on luxuries, mounted from year to year to a tremendous height.

True, the Zollverein was not without its advantages, but it is equally true that an economic alliance of the same sort with any other country would have carried with it far greater and more numerous benefits and far less and far fewer burdens.

THE RAILWAYS

The other consideration as to the railways proved even more pernicious to the

interests of Luxemburg than the Zollverein. The railway question is always a very important one in every country. If in large countries railways prove so frequently an occasion of bitter dissension among commercial interests, how much more would this be the case in a small country where the difficulties arising from conflicting interests are increased by difficulties of an international character? To realize how especially true this is of Luxemburg it suffices to glance at a map of Europe and observe the importance of Luxemburg from a strategic point of view. Germany gave eloquent proof of this in August, 1914, when she invaded the country "to protect her railway interests."

Up to 1871 the railways of Luxemburg—we refer here only to the main railway system, the Guillaume-Luxemburg—were exploited by the Compagnie de l'Est,

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a French concern. At the conclusion of the Franco-Prussian War the Luxemburgers were amazed to find in the Treaty of Frankfurt a clause dealing with the railways of Luxemburg: Germany and France in effect disposing of something that belonged to neither! By the terms of the treaty the French concern was forced to abandon its rights and the German Government immediately took steps which ended in the forcible exploitation of the railway system Guillaume-Luxemburg. The Luxemburger statesmen objected strenuously to the exploitation. Their objections to German arrogance are crystallized in paragraph 2 of the Treaty of June 11, 1872, by which the German Government pledged itself never to use the railways of Luxemburg for any purpose of war, namely transportation of troops, arms, ammunition, supplies, or any such material to be used for waging war.

Those innocent old statesmen with characteristically Luxemburger honesty naïvely believed in the sacredness of the given word, not realizing, of course, that *their* given word *only* was binding and that the Germans' was not a sacred and everlasting bond, but a "scrap of paper" to be torn up at their good pleasure.

THE THREE SOLUTIONS

Thus we see that before the war Luxemburg was completely subsidiary to Germany. That subservience, as is self-evident, must cease when peace is concluded. "If Luxemburg agree to it, Europe would object; and if Europe would agree to it, Luxemburg would object," writes Francis Gribble in *The Nineteenth Century and After*. This expresses very correctly the state of things and it is too self-evident for discussion.

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What then shall become of Luxemburg?

Three principal solutions have been proposed:

1. That Luxemburg should become a completely independent nation.
2. That Luxemburg should amalgamate with France.
3. That Luxemburg should seek an association with Belgium.

The first and the last of these solutions have in Luxemburg a number of followers. The second was nowhere seriously thought of except by a few Luxemburgers resident in Paris, who naturally enough were tempted to impute sentiments to Luxemburgers generally that were merely their own and that, unconsciously we are sure, arise from motives of self-interest and the influence of environment.

According to our method of elimination, we shall consider and discuss the three proposals.

II

THE HYPOTHESIS OF COMPLETE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE

A BEAUTIFUL DREAM

FROM the facts considered in the preceding chapter, it clearly follows, that in spite of her theoretical independence, the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg before the war was tributary to Germany, not only economically but, to a certain extent, also politically. It is natural enough that German domination, so keenly resented by Luxemburg, should give rise to a desire for complete independence. That very clever Englishman, the late John Ruskin, once said

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that the masses catch an opinion as they would a cold, from exposure to infection. And similarly, the masses, when exposed to the infection of a sentimental sophism, are quite liable to catch it. Such precisely is the opinion which favors a completely isolated and independent Luxemburg. It is a solution not without a certain seductive charm, inspired as it is by sentiments natural and noble and altogether creditable to the hearts of its authors.

The lofty patriotic motives that have prompted the desire for a completely independent, Luxemburg, I emphatically avow, are precisely the same as have moved me to pen these lines. I yield to no man in love for the country of my birth. Would to God that this exalted ideal of a completely autonomous Luxemburg were practicable! It is an ideal which excites my warmest sympathy and

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its authors arouse my admiration. But, alas! it is a dream, a beautiful dream to be sure, but still a dream. It is an unattainable ideal that was unrealizable in the past and one whose realization the stern realities and hard necessities of modern life preclude for the future. In no sense am I an iconoclast, and it is the desire to see this ideal realized so far as realizable that has inspired the solution which I propose, the only one, in my humble estimation, compatible with the best interests and the *national* existence of my native land.

THE DEATH-KNELL OF SMALL STATES

The isolation of the Grand Duchy during the war has left its inhabitants in relative ignorance as to the great changes brought about by the colossal conflict. This circumstance may account

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in some measure for the visionary solutions that have been proposed. Those, however, who have at heart the future of their country and who have been in a position to follow closely the great changes that Europe has been undergoing, know that the time has come to face the new conditions that have arisen.

They see at a glance that the hour for states of a medium size has come and that the day for the small state has gone forever. The new states will form along lines of national and racial affinities. The Czechs and the Slovaks will very probably form one single nation instead of two. The Croatians, the Serbians, and the Montenegrins will apparently coalesce into one great Jugo-Slav nation. The Poles will form one great Poland, and Europe, which will comprise many new states, will witness the disappearance of states of minimum importance and

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such as are erected on a basis merely artificial and political. In a Europe thus reconstructed a fully autonomous and completely isolated Luxemburg would stand a pigmy among giants, in constant and great peril of injustice and complete absorption by one of her powerful neighbors, an absorption inevitable in the course of time under such an hypothesis.

ECONOMIC POINT OF VIEW

Those also conversant with the conditions of the new Europe foresee that grave economic problems will beset the future of the European nations. To cling to a narrow and jealous independence is a pretty sentiment, perhaps, but it is not common sense, because it ignores the primary economic condition of the Europe of the present and the future.

In the preceding chapter we have shown

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that the independence nominally possessed by the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg was a mere camouflage to her utter subjection to Germany. But some sort of dependence for Luxemburg is inherent in the nature of things under the present constitution of European society. An isolated Luxemburg would be a political organism so weak and poor and incomplete as must needs look elsewhere for complements to the insufficiency of her economic and political life. In the past Luxemburg had to seek dependence on account of her economic deficiencies. For greater reasons must she cast about for assistance in the future when Luxemburg's economic problems will have vastly increased in their difficulty. In the future a devastated Europe will have no surplus to bestow on such an insignificant country as Luxemburg would be but she will need all her resources for her own reconstruction.

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What then will be the economic régime of the Grand Duchy on the morrow of the war? Depending prior to 1914 entirely on the system of the German Zollverein, the economy of Luxemburg cannot for evident reasons continue to remain subservient to Germany. If Luxemburg should decide on economic independence she would have to provide for herself an economically complete life; or, in other words, satisfy her own needs, which is an absolute impossibility, as Luxemburg can supply very few of her own necessities.

The Grand Duchy is evidently an incomplete economic organism. Practically Luxemburg draws from foreign countries all that is necessary to her economic life. Her agriculture does not suffice for the needs of her own population: the Luxemburgers have to import their food from other countries. The few factories found in the Grand Duchy represent

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necessarily only a small number of industries and they cannot satisfy all the needs of the country. On the other hand, there are some industries in Luxemburg whose production vastly exceeds the local demand for those special products, and if they were destitute of facilities for selling their own products in foreign markets, economic strangulation would ensue. The manufacture of iron in Luxemburg, for instance, which represents the principal industry of the country, before the war was possible only, as is clear, by importation of coal. Thus, without foreign help Luxemburg could not develop her only important resource. In any case she would have to import most of the necessities of life.

Such a situation cannot be viewed without fear for the future. Under ideal circumstances, Luxemburg might succeed by means of the free trade or by means of

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custom arrangements to realize a certain economic equilibrium; but how instable such a situation would be! How dearly and how hardly would products necessary to the everyday life of each Luxemburger be obtained! And who will answer for to-morrow? Who will assure us that her neighbors will not wage an economic war against Luxemburg and erect against her unsurmountable tariff barriers? Finally, even under the hypothesis of the most favorable circumstances, is it not quite clear that such an economic equilibrium so precarious as dependent on the good will of foreigners, yet for Luxemburg a matter of life and death, is it not quite clear, I repeat, that the necessity of such an arrangement would bring her sooner or later under the domination of one of her powerful neighbors?

Instead of running into these dangers, instead of allowing oneself to be be-

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trayed into a disguised and vague economic dependency, would it not be better to decide upon open and definite economic action, affording manifold opportunities and a determined and stable future? Industry and commerce require above all things stability when altogether dependent, as in Luxemburg, on importations and exportations.

In case of economic conventions with Luxemburg, her neighbors would aim at securing the raw iron of Luxemburg and not the highly finished product. Free to impose their conditions on Luxemburg, in case of a negotiation, foreign countries would evidently strive to obtain the raw iron in order to manufacture it at home, thus giving their own people the benefit of this industry. In this way the Grand Duchy would witness the downfall of her splendid iron and steel industry and misery would prevail where once steel

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works and blast furnaces brought prosperity and happiness.

In reality, no matter from what angle the economical future of the Grand Duchy be considered, the country cannot exist without falling under the economic régime of one of her neighbors.

THE RAILWAY QUESTION

The railways, moreover, add to this necessity. The largest railway system of the Grand Duchy, freed by the fortunate conclusion of the war, from the grip of Germany cannot, without suffering and even without becoming a real burden for the state, remain autonomous, because Luxemburg, a country of transit, has a railway that is necessarily destined to convey merchandise from the Rhine region towards the French and Belgian ports.

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The railways of Luxemburg are merely connecting links; it would be difficult for them to remain autonomous. Would Europe allow it? Furthermore, the administration of a small railway section is a burdensome, difficult, expensive, and delicate operation; and far more so proportionately than when part of a large system.

Again, the government of Luxemburg has always considered itself unable to administer its principal railway system, and one might recall the astonishment provoked in the parliament in 1872 by a member who proposed that the government should take them over.

If the government of Luxemburg would administer the Guillaume-Luxembourg railway system, which is the only one in Luxemburg worthy of the name, is it not to be feared that it would fall on the same level as that notorious "Jangli,"

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which is the opprobrious name bestowed by the dissatisfied victims of governmental administration upon the unique railway that the government of Luxemburg is administering?

In order that the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg be worthy of the name of a nation and in order that the Luxemburgers may in truth continue to sing their national anthem, *Feierwon* (The Locomotive), it is necessary that Luxemburg should possess a railway worthy of the song and worthy to convey the numerous excursionists and admirers of her scenic grandeur.

POLITICAL POINT OF VIEW

The complete independence of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg appears equally dangerous and impossible from an internal political point of view. Politi-

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cally speaking, the Grand Duchy would in this hypothesis also be an incomplete organism.

A modern state properly to discharge its functions requires an elaborate and complicated system of political and economic machinery which is out of the question for Luxemburg. Whether it be a matter of civil, commercial, penal, or social legislature, of social and economic organisms, representation abroad, institutions of higher learning, scientific institutions, the defense of the country, banking and other financial organizations—obviously in the case of such a small country as Luxemburg would be—the hypothesis is impossible.

We, whom the war has kept afar from the native soil and who have found in America a country of hospitality and liberty and the best of refuges, have painfully felt how troublesome it would be for the

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Grand Duchy of Luxemburg to exist as an incomplete organism in the sphere of diplomatic and consular representation in foreign countries.

Belonging to a nationality unknown in most of the countries, without consular aid, without diplomatic assistance, the Luxemburger is in foreign countries an unfortunate wanderer, suspected and not knowing at what door to knock. He cannot obtain the passports which enable him to return home, he has not the facility of correspondence at the disposal of citizens of allied and neutral countries; he is not protected from censorship; in one word, he does not know where to go, he does not know where to address himself, and he envies from the bottom of his heart those who possess a nationality that is known, respected, and represented.

The maintenance of an adequate representation for Luxemburg in foreign coun-

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tries is an impossibility. The entire budget of Luxemburg being of forty-two million francs only, it is impossible for the government to raise a sufficiency for the conduct of foreign affairs. Some twenty years ago, when the Luxemburgers of the United States realized the great need of Luxemburger consuls in America and when an extended movement was set on foot to obtain recognition for a Luxemburger consular representative in this country, they were told that the financial resources of the Grand Duchy were not adequate to an establishment of this nature.

It is true that the diplomatists and the consuls of the Netherlands are empowered to act as representatives of Luxemburg. But such an arrangement has proved most unsatisfactory and from personal experience, confirmed by the narratives of many of my countrymen, I daresay that the money provided for this purpose is, as

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far as the convenience of the traveling Luxemburger is concerned, a complete waste.

It is hardly necessary to add that the internal political régime of Luxemburg seems doomed to foreign influence. It was thus in the past and it would be difficult for it to be otherwise in the future.

Whatever be the good intentions of those now at the helm, who would dare to wager that the governments which will succeed each other will not determine upon a policy dictated from outside? The Luxemburgers have too much good sense and too ardent a love for liberty not to prefer the reality of independence to its mere semblancy.

THE INTERNATIONAL STATUS OF LUXEMBURG

From an international point of view isolation is equally impossible. The

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Grand Duchy by its geographic position is the meeting point of the Teutonic and Western civilization. At this time, when the Allies, in order to render impossible another invasion like that of 1914, are taking military precautions and are more than ever anxious to safeguard their boundaries from all danger, it seems improbable that they would be inclined to permit the Grand Duchy to be an open door to a repetition of the invasion of 1914. They are unwilling that their positions on the frontiers of Alsace and Lorraine or on those of the Eifel Hill, be flanked by the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg. They will not leave Luxemburg an uncertain quantity from a military point of view; neither will they rest indifferent as to the influence which will direct her external policies as well as her economic régime.

ILLUSORY GUARANTEES

Notwithstanding the fact that the best interests of Luxemburg are incompatible with absolute independence—an independence as we have seen in any case chimerical and illusory in the highest degree—nevertheless there are some who cling to this theory for fear of a future war in which Luxemburg might be involved.

But have not the happenings of the last four years proved irrefutably that immunity, even when guaranteed by the Great Powers, is no assurance against war? Luxemburg and Belgium are convincing examples that it is not. "Guarantees," said Frederick II, "are like filigranes, more to satisfy the eyes than for their intrinsic value." "And never," says Klueber, "have guarantees preserved Europe from war."

III

THE FRENCH SOLUTION

A FACTITIOUS PROPAGANDA

IF, before this war, Luxemburg had to determine her own future, very few Luxemburgers indeed would have even thought of an association with France in any form. We are forced to take it into consideration now merely because a few Luxemburgers residing in Paris, influenced, no doubt, by their environment, have staged a vast propaganda in favor of the annexation to France, a propaganda that might lead a superficial and unsophisticated observer to believe that there are serious arguments or a sincere desire on the part of the Luxemburgers

generally in favor of this solution. Their own opinion to the contrary notwithstanding, there is nothing important or noteworthy about these people but their noise. The celebrated simile of Edmund Burke fits them exactly. They are like the cricket of the field that makes more noise than all the majestic cattle grazing there. Of course, the Luxemburgers have great sympathy and admiration for France. But, to conclude from that to a desire of becoming French—for, note well, they speak only of annexing Luxemburg to France—is in some respects the same as pretending that America wants to become French. Does not every American love and admire gallant France that has always stood on the ramparts of civilization, ready to defend and help the weak? Does not the whole world love and admire France?

Luxemburg bears to France the same

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relation as her other neighbors where the French civilization has penetrated and diffused the radiance of its brilliant culture. One of the attributes of French culture is precisely its pervasive power and easy adaptation, which permits so many nations to make it their own. But admiration of French civilization by no means implies any desire on the part of Luxemburg to abdicate her nationality in favor of France. Henry de Bornier has very cleverly expressed that thought in his *Roland* where Charles the Great utters the hope "that every man should have two countries: his own and France."

It is sufficient, moreover, to know the characteristic traits of the Luxemburger and the Frenchman to perceive that the two mentalities are diametrically opposed. The character of the Luxemburger has nothing in common with that of the Frenchman, which is Latin. There do

not exist between Luxemburgers and Frenchmen those common traits of character that are found, for instance, between the Swiss of Latin and German origin, between the Belgians of Walloon and Fleming origin, traits which are the result of a long life in common and of a mutual and intense compenetration. These close relations between France and Luxemburg have never existed, unless during the small span of time when Luxemburg, a vanquished state, was under French law. Luxemburg was French during the French Revolution and under Napoleon, but at the same time half of Europe was French. The French occupation has, moreover, left memories in Luxemburg which are not of a character to inspire the wish that it be renewed. The soldiers of the Directorate behaved very badly. There were extortions and massacres; there was a Peasants' War

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repressed with great severity. A monument was erected some twenty years ago at Clervaux in the memory of the heroes who shed their blood fighting the revolutionary soldatesca, and Mass is still sung at Dudelange for the souls of the civilians who were murdered when the French sacked the village. Grandmothers scare the little ones in the nursery into obedience with the name of Robespierre—they call him “Rookelspeer.”

“Seldom,” writes Mr. George Renwick, “has wrong penetrated so deeply into the soul of a little community. For that reason Dudelange has always associated the French with all that is most evil. The memory of that butchery and its losses is one which nothing that France might ever do, could possibly wipe out. To-day, the ill-will finds fiery expression

as though the deed were of yesterday's doing."

No doubt, there is something of picturesque exaggeration in that estimate, comments Francis Gribble in *The Nineteenth Century and After*, and we quite agree with him, for every Luxemburger knows that whatever the French of the eighteenth century might have done, they are to-day a humane and civilized people. However, this memory does still live and it alone constitutes a striking proof of the fact that this propaganda was not conceived in the bosom of the people of Luxemburg.


A PIN IN A HAYSTACK

Having thus examined the Francophile movement as to its possible origin with the people of Luxemburg, we feel spontaneously that neither history nor char-

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acter offer a sufficient basis for such a project. We are now led to examine whether the two countries have common interests such that they would demand a life in common. Not only do we find nothing in its favor, but on the contrary, there are many and serious objections to be raised against it.

The Luxemburgers, although their country is small and their number few, are animated with the most intense love for their nation, its freedom and independence. Never will the Luxemburgers freely abdicate their nationality. Never will they renounce willingly the rights which they have acquired by centuries of separate existence and allow their country to become an insignificant part of a large nation and their capital an obscure provincial town. We know that in the past considerations of that nature have played very little part in the determina-



Comparative Areas of France and Luxemburg

tion of the status of small nations, but we firmly believe, and our belief is based on the utterances of those whose influence will be paramount, that the Peace Conference of Paris will consider them.

What a small territory does Luxemburg occupy when compared to France! Before the war, the area of France was of 207,054 sq. m.; that of Luxemburg 999 sq. m.! France had 40,000,000 inhabitants and Luxemburg scarcely 250,000! And in the coming year France will at least be enlarged by Alsace and Lorraine, that is to say, several departments and 1,800,000 inhabitants. These figures strikingly illustrate the importance that the interests and the wishes of the Luxemburgers would have at the Palais Bourbon when divergent from those of France. It is possible that in the beginning, France might try to avoid anything that would confirm these justifiable fears.

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But we know that good resolutions of a new régime are similar to the celebrated New Year's resolutions that last as long as the year is new.

One question, for instance, on which the attitude of France and that of the majority of the Luxemburgers is diametrically opposite is the religious question. Luxemburg knows only the régime of the Concordat which France renounced many years ago. The great majority of the people of Luxemburg are fervent Catholics who hold their religion very dear, and they have learned during the decades preceding the war to associate with France the pictures of fugitive monks and nuns, begging their daily bread, driven away from their own country by sacrilegious laws, inspired by an insane hatred toward the Church. Would not the friction inevitably resulting from divergence of opinion on a point so

fundamental immediately alienate from France the new member of her family?

ECONOMIC POINT OF VIEW

The economic intercourse between France and Luxemburg before the war was trifling, as anyone may see by consulting the statistics on the point. It is true that the Zollverein of which Luxemburg formed part is to some extent responsible for this state of affairs. Not altogether, however, for the word of Horace:

“Naturam expellas furca, tamen usque
 recurret,
Et mala perrumpet furtim fastidia vic-
 trix,”

which Destouches translates, “Chase the natural and it will gallop back,” may be applied to nations as well as individuals. France and the French harbors are no more the natural economic roads of

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Luxemburg than Germany and the German harbors. The reason for this lies in the simple fact that the harbors of Le Havre and Dunkirk are measurably distant from Luxemburg and are not connected with Luxemburg by a direct railway system; circumstances which not only delay the transportation of merchandise to Luxemburg, but also considerably increase the freight rates.

It is true that if Luxemburg formed part of France the difficulties resulting from the absence of coal in the Grand Duchy would vanish. But it is equally true that Luxemburg may obtain coal without completely giving up her life as a separate political organism.

FRANCE, "QUEEN OF IRON"

The fact that with the annexation of Luxemburg to France the latter coun-



Iron and Coal Regions

try would acquire the iron fields of the Grand Duchy and thus possess, so to speak, the monopoly of iron in Europe, is the most interesting side of the question. The return of Lorraine to France will add to her iron fields the western part of the Bassin de Briey, which before the war supplied Germany with seventy-five per cent. of her iron. If the iron resources of Luxemburg be furthermore added to this already very large percentage of the European iron, France would constitute a huge iron trust. While the guns were yet roaring Francis Laur proclaimed France "Queen of Iron" if Alsace Lorraine were restored to her.

Considered from this point of view, the Luxemburg question becomes indeed an international question of the greatest importance. Her annexation to France constitutes a grave danger to Europe, for it is of first importance that there remain

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sources of iron and steel in Europe not belonging to a great power. The economic autonomy of Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, the Scandinavian countries, etc., depends on this condition.

The chief problem is whether the bulk of the European pig-iron shall belong to one country which might have very little interest to export it under favorable conditions. It is quite natural to believe that France, possessing the largest part of the continental European iron production, will always have an interest in exporting highly finished iron and steel productions, and not the raw material. Iron is the key of modern economic life, and this is the reason why the iron question is of such vast importance.

Another difficulty of international character that would ensue from the annexation of Luxemburg to France is that, possessing Luxemburg, France would en-

circle Belgium from west, south, and east, leaving a small gap only through which Belgium could participate in the economic life of the Rhine region. It goes without saying that in spite of the sacred bonds of friendship that bind France and Belgium, this might greatly disturb the general settlement of Europe.

IMPOSSIBLE MUTILATION

Whether to satisfy everyone or to remove the last mentioned danger, the project of dividing the Grand Duchy between France and Belgium has been agitated.

From a national point of view this solution must evidently be rejected, for Luxemburg is a well-defined nationality and the Luxemburgers cannot suffer foreign interest to come and impose on their country a last mutilation that would

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destroy probably forever the national existence of their ancient race.

From a purely international point of view this solution is equally dangerous as the annexation to France, for the part that would fall to France is precisely the one that contains the iron fields and thus the great danger which we pointed out would still exist.

IV

ASSOCIATION WITH BELGIUM

A NATURAL AND SPONTANEOUS MOVEMENT

SENTIMENT, interest, and reason attract Luxemburg to Belgium. Of Belgium every Luxemburger thinks, when he realizes his country must seek new association. The preservation of her separate national life for Luxemburg, impossible united to France, is easily realizable with Belgium. By association with Luxemburg, such advantages would accrue to Belgium as would justify a modification of some of her institutions in accordance with the national aspirations of Luxemburg, an hypothesis quite out of the

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question and ridiculous in the case of France. Many and vigorous bonds grapple the two countries together with hooks of steel.

THE COMMON HISTORIC PAST

History, an excellent commentary on the needs and life of nations, confirm these statements. Until recently the history of one has been the history of the other. For centuries their fortunes have been common and until 1839 their history ran along parallel lines. From the time of Julius Cæsar, when the territories of both countries were included in the name "Belgica Prima," to the separation of the Grand Duchy in 1839, Belgium and Luxemburg owned a common past.

Since the ninth century, the county of Luxemburg which was later to become the Duchy of Luxemburg formed part

of the lower Lotharingia, to which belonged the principalities of Liège, Brabant, Limburg, Hainaut, and Namur. It is the House of Burgundy (fifteenth century) which reunited under its scepter these different provinces, including Flanders, and laid the foundations of the present Belgian kingdom. In 1451 the Duchy of Luxemburg was definitely and formally united to the other provinces and the constituents of Luxemburg pledged fidelity.

From that day the history of Luxemburg and that of Belgium blend even more intimately. Luxemburg like Belgium, at the extinction of the House of Burgundy, fell successively under Spanish, Austrian, and French régime. Finally the two countries were incorporated into the kingdom of the Netherlands. With the Belgian provinces, Luxemburg shared a common national life during these

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centuries of a common foreign domination, which tended to blend together the people of the different provinces. The Pragmatic Sanction recognized them as one homogeneous people with central institutions at Malines and later at Brussels, institutions which served powerfully to weld them together.

The Congress of Vienna (1815) sowed the seed of dissension, which in 1839 bore fruit. The treaty concluded at that Congress between the new King of the Netherlands, William I, and the Allies, determining the borders of the kingdom of the Netherlands, excluded from it the Duchy of Luxemburg which was erected into a Grand Duchy and given to King William personally in compensation for the provinces of Nassau-Dillenburg, Slegen, Hadamar, and Dietz which fell to the King of Prussia. Article III stipulates that the King of the Netherlands

will bear the title of Grand Duke of Luxemburg and authorizes him to make with regard to his succession in Luxemburg such family arrangements as he might see fit. "The Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, being abandoned to the King as a compensation for his German provinces," the article continued, "will enter into the German confederation. . . ."

Luxemburg, in spite of the bonds which bound the Grand Duke, who was also the King of the Netherlands, to the German Confederation, neither belonged to the Confederation nor was it autonomous. Representatives from Luxemburg sat in the parliament of the kingdom of the Netherlands with which the Grand Duchy had many institutions in common. The King referred to Luxemburg as a province and not as a state; indeed nobody knew just exactly what Luxemburg was then.

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In 1830 the Belgian revolution separated Belgium from Holland. The Luxemburgers participated in the revolution although nominally attached to the German Confederation and until 1839 shared the life of the newly born Belgian kingdom. At that time, 1839, King William I ratified a treaty that had been concluded in 1831, called the Treaty of the Twenty-four Articles, which excluded Luxemburg from Belgium. Previously, however, the western half of the Grand Duchy had been erected into the Belgian province of Luxemburg.

This arrangement, although it gave Luxemburg its autonomy, did not accord with the wishes of the Luxemburgers. The representatives of Luxemburg in the Belgian parliament, who sat there until 1841, protested energetically against this separation.

BELGIAN FRIENDSHIP

Such a common past of necessity gives rise to numerous and strong bonds which cannot be severed by factitious creations of peace conferences. There have existed between Luxemburg and Belgium for two thousand years more than neighborly relations. And even now Luxemburgers enjoy special favor in Belgium. They may acquire Belgian citizenship without going through formalities and without any of the conditions imposed on other foreigners. And Luxemburgers are numerous and frequently very highly placed in the Belgian civil, military, and colonial service. The Belgian universities educate thousands of the Luxemburger youth. On the Belgian side of the 129 kilometers of common border, we find Luxemburgers like ourselves, just as the Belgians find in Luxemburg, not foreigners but brothers.

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The character of the inhabitants of Belgium and Luxemburg exhibit many common traits. The Belgians are like the Luxemburgers a people of the "Marches." Both are on the border line of the two great continental civilizations and are influenced by them, and their own civilization is a blend of both. Indeed it is their mission to serve as an intermediary, and as a clearing-house, so to speak, between the two civilizations. If we might be permitted a personal reference, we would beg leave to cite in this connection our remembrances of the pleasant years we spent as a student in Liège and Louvain, reminiscences confirmed by many of our countrymen who like us sat at those shrines of science and sanctity in these ancient Belgian cities. We all felt perfectly at home there, and those among us who later went to France, Switzerland, or Germany

to complete our studies were impressed by the alien atmosphere of those countries.

After these considerations of a rather sentimental nature, the importance of which, however, cannot be overlooked, let us view the matter from a rational standpoint. In the preceding chapter we have shown that a Luxemburg entirely independent would be economically speaking an incomplete organism. The desire to draw Luxemburg out of that fatal economic isolation would dictate eventually an association with Belgium.

There is no country, except Germany, that had before the war more complete and close economic relations with Luxemburg than Belgium and there exist no two nations in Europe whose economic interests dovetail so perfectly.

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ECONOMIC POINT OF VIEW

Let us consult the statistician and he will show us the magnitude and complexity of the economic relations between Belgium and Luxemburg. Even when Luxemburg was a party to the Zollverein, and when Germany supplied Luxemburg with most of her manufactured products, she imported from Belgium great quantities of numerous products. Statistics show that Belgium furnished Luxemburg in 1913 with 315,905 tons of coal; 2,382,759 klg. of oils; 105,477,503 klg. of lime; 9,385,740 klg. of cement; 1,104,745 klg. of forage; 361,331 klg. of tobacco; 523,575 klg. of tanner's bark; 3,513,233 klg. of hides for tanning industry; 121,416 klg. of wool; 83,721 klg. cotton; 17,256,696 klg. of wheat; 2,654,153 klg. of barley; 13,957,825 klg. of potatoes, etc., etc.

These products embrace so many differ-

ent aspects of the economic life of Luxemburg that one may hope that, upon the cessation of Germany's economic domination, Belgium will furnish Luxemburg, not only with greater quantities but also with many other products, which owing to the Zollverein Luxemburg imported from Germany.

Economically, Luxemburg and Belgium make a perfect match and ought to be married; they mutually complement each other from an economically essential point of view. Luxemburg produces iron, the manufacture of which requires coal, and Belgium produces coal, essential for the manufacture of iron. Indeed, Belgium and Luxemburg might say to each other in the words of the fable of *The Blind and the Paralytic*, by the "grand Bonhomme" Lafontaine, "You shall see for me and I shall walk for you." The Belgian industrial institutions have more-

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over such a need of the iron mines of Luxemburg that before the war some of them had acquired possession of several of the Luxemburger mines, and in the words of a notable Belgian manufacturer the iron region of Luxemburg is the natural complement of the industrial region of the Meuse.

INNUMERABLE ADVANTAGES

In a foregoing chapter, in which we analyzed the hypothesis of the complete political and economic independence of the Grand Duchy, we showed that before the war Luxemburg maintained no representatives in foreign countries except in Paris, Brussels, and Berlin and indeed could not for reason of poverty of means. And yet the war has taught us how necessary the diplomatic and consular institutions are to a country. Not only the

Luxemburgers, whom the war has kept afar from the native soil, but the Grand Duchy itself learned during the war to regret dearly the lack of adequate diplomatic and consular representation, especially in matters of food supply. With an association with Belgium, that difficulty would vanish.

Indeed the association with Belgium would mean participation in all the rights and privileges of Belgian citizens. Let us enumerate some of these: Belgium has magnificent universities; technical, scientific institutions of all sorts; splendidly equipped chambers of commerce; commercial commissions of investigation like the "commission sino-belge," the "commission belgo-russe," the "commission belgo-américaine"; opportunities for brilliant careers in civil, military, diplomatic, and colonial service and among innumerable other benefits the port of Antwerp,

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the finest in Europe, none of which transcendent advantages does Luxemburg enjoy and all of which she would acquire by an association with Belgium.

THE BELGIAN CONGO

Besides, Belgium has in the Congo one of the richest and most magnificent colonies possessed by any nation in the world. M. Gérard, the former French ambassador to Belgium, has recently written a notable article in the *Revue Hebdomadaire* wherein he unfolds the magnificent possibilities of that vast tract of land. To sum up briefly the findings of statisticians in that colony, we might say without the slightest exaggeration that the former Congo Free State is at least as rich in natural resources as all of Europe, and in territory more than half as large. Luxemburg, of course, by association

with Belgium would share on equal terms with Belgium the advantages accruing from the possession of so magnificent a colony.

LUXEMBURG'S TERRA IRREDENTA


Moreover, by association with Belgium Luxemburg would be in better position to claim the return of her "Terra Irredenta" and a rectification of the injustice done her in 1815 when the present Prussian counties of Saint Vith, Schleiden, Cronenburg, Bitburg, a large section along the right bank of the Mosel and the region of Vilingen on the Sarre were torn away from the Duchy of Luxemburg. Without any justification whatsoever except dynastic interest, the Congress of Vienna transferred these territories to Prussia. There still exists to-day a great sympathy and a well-

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defined identity of character between the inhabitants of these counties and the Luxemburgers. To-day, more than a hundred years after this injustice, the Luxemburgers have in their dialect an expressive term to designate their lost brethren. They call them *Musspreisen*, which does not mean "Musty Prussians" as some might think, but "Prussians by force." Now that so many injustices committed by Prussia in the past are going to be put right, would it not be natural and fair that Luxemburg should recover her lost provinces and reunite brethren torn asunder by brutal violence? Incidentally it would weaken Germany and strengthen the Entente and indirectly reward Belgium for the glorious services that her heroic valor has contributed to the cause of freedom and humanity.

||||| PRESENT GRAND-DUCHY OF
LUXEMBOURG.

||||| TERRITORY TAKEN BY
PRUSSIA IN 1815.



Territory Taken by Prussia in 1815



V

A MODE OF ASSOCIATION WITH BELGIUM

THE "BELGO-LUXEMBURGER UNION"

BY a sincere and conscientious analysis of the different possibilities we have arrived at length at the conclusion that the future welfare of Luxemburg lies in an association with Belgium. We shall now consider some of the circumstances of the projected rapprochement.

From what we have said in the preceding chapters, it clearly follows that common economic and military régime, always, however, preserving the national life of Luxemburg as a separate organism, must form the basis of an understanding be-

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tween Luxemburg and Belgium. Be it said right here, to tranquillize those who see the ghost of Prussianism in every military establishment, that the military accord between the two countries would not necessarily involve universal military service for the Luxemburgers; although it is pretty generally believed that a certain amount of military training has the most salutary effect on the youth of a country. My experiences, while teaching in a military college, have fully convinced me of this fact. The general agitation against military armaments will probably result in greatly reduced military service consisting of a mitigated form of conscription or in a simple voluntary system, destined to furnish a restricted contingent necessary for the preservation of order. The natural result of an association of the two countries will be a merging of their foreign relations. It

will furthermore mean a transfer of the railways from Prussia to Belgium which country, by the way, has one of the finest and best equipped railway systems of Europe.

The formula that would govern this relationship between the two countries cannot be better expressed than in the words: "Belgo - Luxemburger Union." The projected Union according to terms previously agreed upon will preserve to Luxemburg the separate national life impossible for her to maintain of herself. Interests common to the two countries will be pooled, specific national interests will be managed separately by their respective governments. Observe, that the Union is by no means an annexation because it preserves the specific national life and it is more than an alliance because it merges permanently the common interests of the two governments. Lux-

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emburgers have a national individuality too vigorous, too clear-cut, too highly developed, to submit willingly to any arrangement that would not recognize their country as a separate organism. But they realize also that it would be contrary to their best interests and highly dangerous to enter into a mere alliance that would make them a football for the interests of their powerful neighbors and leave them in constant and grave danger of absorption.

ADMINISTRATION OF THE UNION

An association of the two countries based on these principles may certainly be realized in many different ways. Friendly discussions between the parties interested cannot fail to disclose a working arrangement satisfactory to both. May we anticipate a discussion of such an

arrangement? Before doing so, however, let us add that any projected system will be susceptible of considerable emendation, for experience alone will perfect the details.

In any proposed association the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg must retain her supremacy in all spheres not common with Belgium. Luxemburg would therefore have her own sovereign, her parliament, her government, her budget, etc. For the administration of the prerogatives abandoned to the Union there would be constituted some sort of Federal Authority, the executive power of which would rest with the King of the Belgians. A Federal Government consisting of Belgian Ministers and Secretaries of State for Luxemburg would be created to administer the common interests. The Secretaries of State for Luxemburg would be responsible to a legislative body whose members

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would be selected by the Parliament of Luxemburg and revocable by it. This legislative body, possessing the right of initiative, should be small and its logical seat would be in Brussels where the Federal Government would also reside. In order that laws concerning common interests be binding for Luxemburg, they would have to be passed by that legislative body, signed by the King, and countersigned by the Secretary of State for Luxemburg whose department the projected law would concern. Similarly a royal proclamation concerning both countries would have to bear the signatures of the Secretaries of State for Luxemburg as well as those of the King and the Belgian Ministers. The Secretaries of State for Luxemburg would assist the different departments of the Belgian Government dealing with common interests; namely, as regards:

The Department of Foreign Affairs;

The Department of War;

The Department of Finances, as far as customs and excise are concerned; and

The Department of Railways.

CONCLUSION

Such in short we would suggest as the policy best calculated to promote the interests of the Luxemburgers. We do not presume to go into detail as the details only experience and expert knowledge can determine, to neither of which do we pretend. To be sure, it is a radical change and there may arise at first some difficulty of adjustment to the new conditions. But whatever difficulty there may be in the settlement, we are certain time and a moderate amount of patience and of courage will surmount. At any

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rate, whatever the difficulty, the change must be made. Sentiment, reason, and interest demand it. We do not want to be French, and frankly, that is what any connection with France would mean. But we cannot exist alone, we need association to complete the insufficiency of our economic and political life, and Belgium supplies us with that necessary complement; Belgium is kindred in race, has parallel interests, common aspirations, and identical sympathies. Therefore, sentiment, reason, and interest point to the "Belgo-Luxemburger Union" as the best solution to the problem now confronting Luxemburg.

FINIS

**Reproduction of Some of the Petitions
Signed in 1839 Throughout the
Grand Duchy of Luxemburg
as a Protest Against Sepa-
ration from Belgium**

Le Roi!

Sire

La dissolution du territoire dont
nous menons le traité est
24 articles Seront le laque
de mort du Luxembourg
et le Viscomte de laite
la Belgique. L'honneur
de la Belgique, Sire, c'est

le malheur, jamais un être
 Majesté ou pouvoir souffrir
 qu'un être n'ait souffert
 mis. Nous, Dieu, nous
 ne succédons devant aucun
 sacrifice pour éloigner
 le malheur qui plane
 sur nos têtes.

C'est l'espoir et la résolu-
 tion dont le sacrifice
 trahissant du l'autre Co-
 Lill Will, viennent
 déposer l'expression entre
 nos mains.

L'écriture le 20 mai 1832.

Monseigneur

Monseigneur de la Cour

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Matthias Beringer
Karl Schmid
Hans Schmid

Ulrich Linckla Probst
Gerdner Hofmann
Anton Hofmann

Anton Hofmann
Hans Hofmann
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